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Swearing by New Technology:
Strengthening the Fourth Amendment by Utilizing
Modern Warrant Technology While Satisfying the
Oath or Affirmation Clause
INTRODUCTION
Against the backdrop of unwarranted governmental intrusions
into the private lives of Americans, the Framers penned the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states in part,
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation.” 1 After nearly two-and-a-half centuries, judicial
decisions have slowly whittled exceptions into the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause, incidentally carving chunks out of the
values that the amendment was designed to preserve. One of these
exceptions in particular, the exigent circumstances exception, has led
to a significant increase in the number of warrantless searches and
seizures conducted by government officials. 2 This relatively recent
proliferation of warrantless invasions into the private lives of
American citizens stands in stark contrast to the privacy interests the
Framers intended that the Fourth Amendment protect and preserve.
As some scholars have noted, the advent of modern
telecommunication technology provides courts with the opportunity
to rein in the use of the exigent circumstances exception as a
justification for warrantless searches. 3 Modern means of
communication help facilitate seamless contact between law
enforcement officials requesting search warrants in the field and
judges reviewing the warrant applications. This modern technology
serves to dramatically reduce the time needed for a judge to review
an application and issue a warrant upon probable cause. 4 As the time
needed for a law enforcement officer to procure a warrant decreases,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using
Magistrates, Incentives, and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 303 (1996).
2. Justin H. Smith, Note, Press One for Warrant: Reinventing the Fourth Amendment’s
Search Warrant Requirement Through Electronic Procedures, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1593 (2002).
3. See Beci, supra note 1, at 294–96; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 1595–96.
4. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1625.
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the situations in which the exigent circumstances exception applies
should also decrease. This Comment submits that modern
telecommunications technology has arrived at the point where the
communication between a judge and a field officer to obtain a
warrant is so seamless and requires so little time that the exigent
circumstances exception should be virtually eliminated.
By identifying the benefits of implementing modern technology
in the warrant process and the consequences of failing to do so, this
Comment advocates updating state criminal codes to allow law
enforcement officers and reviewing courts to utilize this technology in
an effort to narrow the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement. However, implementing
communication technology to procure warrants comes with potential
constitutional pitfalls that state legislatures must carefully avoid.
Because technology allows for law enforcement officers to apply for a
warrant without ever personally appearing in front of a magistrate or,
in some situations, without ever speaking to a magistrate, state
legislatures need to ensure that their state’s electronic warrant systems
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s Oath or Affirmation Clause. This is
the first comment that prescribes different methods by which state
legislatures can ensure that this constitutional requirement is met in
the context of implementing modern communications systems for
warrant applications in an effort to narrow the exigent circumstances
exception.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause and the values that the clause is
designed to preserve. Part I also gives an account of the Warrant
Clause’s gradual erosion through the exigent circumstances
exception. Next, Part II proposes that the situations in which the
exigent circumstances exception applies can be dramatically reduced,
if not entirely eliminated, through the use of technology in the
warrant procurement process. Finally, Part III recommends that state
legislatures should be mindful of the oath or affirmation requirement
of the Fourth Amendment as they implement technology in their
electronic warrant application systems. Part III also provides a
historical account of what constitutes an oath or affirmation and
recommends three forms of possible electronic warrant systems that
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s Oath or Affirmation Clause.
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I. THE WARRANT CLAUSE AND THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause is a textual instrument
designed to protect many of the values that the Framers held to be
of paramount importance. Understanding the historical factors
driving the amendment’s creation and the values it is designed to
protect helps one comprehend the importance of its preservation and
enforcement. Nearly two-and-a-half centuries of judicial decisions
have slowly whittled exceptions into the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Clause, incidentally carving chunks out of the values that
the Framers intended the amendment to preserve. One of these
exceptions in particular, the exigent circumstances exception, has had
a significant impact by allowing the government to more readily
conduct warrantless searches and seizures. Understanding the
justifications for the exigent circumstances exception helps one
understand the role that technology can have in reducing the need
for the exception and thus reducing the number of warrantless
searches and seizures.
A. The History of the Warrant Clause and the Values It Is Designed to
Protect
Scholars generally agree that the Warrant Clause was intended
to prevent unbridled governmental intrusion into an individual’s
privacy. 5 The Framers were well aware of the immense and inherent
dangers that can arise from a government having unchecked power
to search and seize the property and person of its citizens. 6 In
drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers were influenced by
abusive British law enforcement methods, particularly the general
search warrant and writ of assistance, which provided government
officials with virtually limitless discretion to search and seize the
property of the colonists. 7 “The inequities which resulted from

5. For a more detailed discussion of the historical events preceding the Fourth
Amendment’s ratification, see generally JACOB W. LANDYSNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1966); NELSON B. LARSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
6. Beci, supra note 1, at 303.
7. See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review,
77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1997); see also Beci, supra note 1, at 303.
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abuse of the writs of assistance are well documented and were a
major impetus in the occurrence of the American revolution.” 8
In response to the British officers’ abuse of power, the Framers
set about crafting a system that would restrain such broad
government discretion. 9 During the ratification debates, the lack of a
constitutional provision addressing the searches and seizures became
a hot-button issue. 10 Some of the Framers were concerned that
unless they limited the situations in which a warrantless search was
permitted, the new American government would eventually commit
the same types of abuse against its citizens that were experienced
under British rule. 11 In response to this concern, James Madison
drafted the Fourth Amendment.
Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to impose three
basic requirements for the issuance of a warrant: (1) the warrant
must be based “upon probable cause,” (2) the probable cause
showing must be “supported by Oath or affirmation,” and (3) the
warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” 12
The Framers intended the Warrant Clause to “balance[] the
privacy interests of individual citizens with the security needs of the
general public,” 13 while protecting “against government tyranny and
capriciousness.” 14 Commentators generally recognize that the
requirements set forth in the Fourth Amendment are “consistent
with the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution to limit
the government’s discretion to search and seize.” 15
Naturally, imposing requirements on the government to obtain a
warrant impedes, to some extent, the government’s ability to enforce
8. Beci, supra note 1, at 303.
9. See id.
10. Anita Eve, Statutory Right to a Warrant, District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Project on Criminal Procedure, 26 HOW. L.J. 844, 849 (1983).
11. Beci, supra note 1, at 303.
12. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
13. Michael John James Kuzmich, www.warrant.com: Arrest and Search Warrants by
E-mail, Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation: Criminal Procedure, 30 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 590, 590 (1999); see also Beci, supra note 1, at 304.
14. Beci, supra note 1, at 294; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 1600.
15. Beci, supra note 1, at 294.
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its laws; however, such restraints are widely accepted as necessary to
protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and to protect the
privacy of citizens. 16 Therefore, the Framers went to great measures
to ensure that the privacy of American citizens would be preserved
despite an inevitable decrease in law enforcement efficiency. This
decrease in law enforcement efficiency is simply the cost to be paid
by society to protect the liberty and privacy interests of Americans.
B. Unwarranted Searches and the Fourth Amendment’s Erosion
Through Exceptions
Despite the paramount importance that the Framers placed on
protecting citizens from unwarranted intrusions into their privacy,
courts have gradually shifted the balance to favor the needs of
efficient law enforcement through various exceptions to the Warrant
Clause requirements. Currently, courts recognize over twenty
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 17 Over
the last several decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly narrowed
the range of situations in which a warrant is required, so much so
that warrants have arguably become the exception rather than the
general rule. 18 Indeed, exceptions to the Warrant Clause have
become so numerous that one commentator claims that the
exceptions have eclipsed the rule itself. 19
Of the numerous court-sanctioned exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the exigent circumstances exception has perhaps had
the greatest impact on increasing the number of situations in which a
warrantless search is permitted. 20 The exigent circumstances
exception applies when there is a compelling need for a government
official to act and the official does not have time to secure a
warrant. 21 Whether or not an official can use the exception to negate
16. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (“Any warrant requirement
impedes to some extent the vigor with which the Government can seek to enforce its laws, yet
the Fourth Amendment recognizes that this restraint is necessary in some cases to protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); H. Morley Swingle & Lane P. Thomasson,
Beam Me Up: Upgrading Search Warrants with Technology, 69 J. MO. B. 16, 17 (2013)
(“Invading someone’s person, home, papers or effects is a serious matter.”).
17. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
18. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 882 (1991).
19. See Beci, supra note 1, at 295.
20. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1593–94.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir. 1998).
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the warrant requirement depends on what courts determine “exigent”
to mean. 22 Some common examples of situations in which courts have
determined the exigent circumstances exception to apply include the
hot pursuit of a dangerous suspect 23 or the need to prevent the
destruction of evidence. 24 The implied justification for the exception is
that requiring law enforcement officers to travel to a courthouse to
obtain a warrant by traditional means 25 would “take too long and
would unreasonably handicap law enforcement efforts.” 26
Indeed, police investigations are typically driven by a sense of
urgency combined with the concern that evidence will disappear,
metabolize, 27 or otherwise escape. This urgency creates pressure,
often accommodated by the courts, to streamline law enforcement
procedures and eliminate the often inconvenient requirement to
obtain a warrant before conducting a search or seizure of a suspect.
However, as the Eighth Circuit stated in United States v. Bozada, “If
the processes of our government are such that police officers are
unable to secure search warrants . . . then the cure for that problem is
not to sacrifice the Fourth Amendment rights of our citizens, but to
streamline the warrant procuring procedure.” 28 With modern
advances in technology, the procedure by which law enforcement
officers obtain warrants can and should be streamlined. If the process
is significantly streamlined, the amount of time that it takes for a law
enforcement officer to obtain a warrant will be significantly reduced.
Consequently, if a law enforcement officer can obtain a warrant in a
shorter amount of time, the situations in which the exigent
circumstances exception applies will diminish.

22. Smith, supra note 2, at 1594.
23. See, e.g., United States. v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 36 (1st Cir. 2003); see also In
re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
24. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Mitchell, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1020 (C.D. Ill. 2012).
25. See infra Part II (discussing the traditional method of obtaining a warrant by
appearing before a judge in person).
26. Smith, supra note 2, at 1594.
27. A common warrantless search that courts in many jurisdictions have upheld as lawful
under the exigent circumstances exception occurs when law enforcement officers perform a
blood draw on a driver without first obtaining a warrant after law enforcement officers had
probable cause to suspect that a driver had operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
This needs to be done in a timely manner in order to ensure that evidence of the suspect’s
blood alcohol level was measured before the driver metabolized the alcohol. See, e.g., People v.
Thompson, 135 P.3d 3, 17 (Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 980 (2006).
28. 473 F.2d 389, 394–95 (8th Cir. 1973), quoted in Smith, supra note 2, at 1625–26.
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II. REINVIGORATING THE WARRANT CLAUSE: USING TECHNOLOGY
TO REIN IN THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION
“In this modern day of electronics and computers, we foresee a
time in the near future when the warrant requirement . . . can be
fulfilled virtually without exception.” 29 The Oregon Supreme Court
made this prediction nearly three decades ago. The time has come
when advances in technology should be used to reinvigorate the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by narrowing its
exceptions. 30 This is especially true with regards to the exigent
circumstances exception. Courts should reevaluate the exigent
circumstances exception in light of the technology that is readily
available to law enforcement officers. This technology expedites the
warrant procurement process so as to virtually eliminate
circumstances that can truly be considered exigent. 31
Before relatively recent advances in technology, the traditional
method for a law enforcement officer to obtain a search warrant
required the requesting officer to appear personally before a neutral
magistrate. The officer would then present the magistrate with a
sworn affidavit that contained the information alleging to show
probable cause for the warrant. 32 If the magistrate deemed the
officer’s affidavit sufficient, the magistrate would provide the officer
with a written warrant, 33 which the officer would take with him
when conducting the search or arrest. 34
In 1977, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended
to authorize telephonic search warrants. 35 The Federal Rules of
29. State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1363 n.6 (Or. 1986).
30. Smith, supra note 2, at 1595.
31. See Edward F. Marek, Telephonic Search Warrants: A New Equation for Exigent
Circumstances, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35, 36 (1978) (“The availability of telephonic search
warrants affects most directly the body of decisional authority permitting warrantless searches
where exigent circumstances exist.”).
32. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (explaining the
requirements for probable cause).
33. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity of, and Admissibility of Evidence
Discovered in, Search Authorized by Judge over Telephone, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1145, 1148 (1985).
34. Id.
35. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) (1977) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(3))
(stating, in relevant part, “[i]f the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a written
affidavit, a Federal magistrate may issue a warrant based upon sworn . . . testimony
communicated by telephone or other appropriate means”). The process of obtaining a
telephonic search warrant under the method proscribed in the Federal Rules has been
described as follows:
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Criminal Procedure were amended again in 1993 to allow magistrates
to use fax machines to receive warrant applications and issue
warrants. 36 Most recently, in 2006, Congress once again amended the
Federal Rules to permit warrants to be issued “based on information
communicated by . . . other reliable electronic means.” 37 Therefore,
even before the 2006 amendment, courts had generally permitted
warrants to be obtained through electronic means. 38
One of the reasons that Congress began permitting law
enforcement officers to obtain search warrants by telephone in 1977
was to make it easier to get warrants quickly, thereby
“circumscrib[ing] [the] use of the exigent circumstances
exception.” 39 The same reasoning can logically be applied to the
1993 and 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules. The federal
system’s success in encouraging the implementation of technology to
expedite the warrant procurement process has encouraged many
states to adopt similar statutes authorizing the use of technology to
expedite their own processes. 40

[T]he officer requesting a telephonic warrant must prepare a duplicate original
warrant containing information that would normally be provided by an affiant in
front of a magistrate. After describing the circumstances of time and place which
make it reasonable to request the issuance of a warrant based on oral testimony and
after being placed under oath, the officer must then read the duplicate original
warrant verbatim to the federal magistrate who will document the conversation
using a recording device or stenographic transcript. If the magistrate determines that
probable cause exists to justify the search, the magistrate will direct the requesting
officer to sign the duplicate warrant while the magistrate signs and dates the
original. Copies of these documents are then filed at the courthouse.
Smith, supra note 2, at 1606 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
36. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) (1994) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(d)(3)).
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(3)(A) (2007) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(d)(3)).
38. See, e.g., California v. McCraw, 276 Cal. Rptr. 208, 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“A
warrant may be sent by any electronic method, and it is just as effective as the original.”).
39. Smith, supra note 2, at 1606–07; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) (amended
1977), advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 19 U.S.C. App., at 1672–74 (Supp. III 1979).
40. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1608–14. Many states have adopted electronic signature
and warrant statutes, including Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-106 (West 2012));
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.02 (West 2013)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-8
(West 2014)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2603.1 (2010), LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 162.2 (2012)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.651 (West 2009));
Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 542.276 (West 2010)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 595-A:4-a (2014)); and Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-6-109 (West 2014)).
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Technology is rapidly approaching the point where electronic
communication between the law enforcement officers in the field
and the magistrate issuing the warrant is continuously available,
thereby narrowing the situations in which the exigent circumstances
exception should be applied. 41 In this modern age of high-powered
laptops equipped with cellular access to the Internet, police (like the
general public) have ready access to communication methods such as
email, instant messaging, and even face-to-face video conferencing
wherever they go. 42 These new methods of reliable communication
make it possible for law enforcement officers to quickly obtain a
warrant from a judge without leaving the area they are investigating.
Before modern technology, the exigent circumstances exception
routinely allowed officers to conduct warrantless searches when the
officer believed that the person or property he wished to search
would disappear, 43 the evidence would be destroyed, 44 or someone
would be put in danger if the officer took the time necessary to
obtain a warrant before searching. 45
These “[a]dvances in electronic and telecommunications
technology, however, have eliminated many of the temporal and
geographic hurdles which previously prolonged the time needed to
obtain a warrant.” 46 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has stated that “courts must . . . consider the
amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant . . . in determining
whether exigent circumstances exist.” 47 In a case that dealt with the
practicality of obtaining a telephonic warrant, a California Court of
Appeals determined in 1983 that a warrant could be obtained by
telephone in less than forty-five minutes. 48 With more modern
41. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1595.
42. See Beci, supra note 1, at 297–98 (noting that in 1996, when the article was written,
“computers can transmit both the warrant application and the approved warrant
electronically—directly from the officer’s computer to the magistrate’s computer and then back
again—through a cellular modem”).
43. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769–70 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444–45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 858 (1988).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 440 F. Supp. 272, 286–87 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
aff’d, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978).
46. Beci, supra note 1, at 319–20.
47. United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
48. People v. Blackwell, 195 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Notably,
this case was decided before the advent of cell phones. Reaching a magistrate at unusual hours
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modes of communication available, such as email, video messaging,
and text messaging, the amount of time required to obtain a warrant
today would almost always be considerably less. Given our currently
available technological resources, all on-call magistrates could
theoretically be reached at any time and in any place by cell phone,
tablet, or laptop. These resources would allow magistrates to answer
phone calls or review electronic warrant submissions wherever they
are with little or no delay. 49 When delays in the warrant procurement
process are virtually eliminated, so too is the exigent circumstances
exception. 50
Failure to implement new technology in the warrant procurement
process will potentially lead to an increase in warrantless searches,
further diminishing the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause. As the population in the United States
grows, and as new forms of crime and terrorism emerge, the already
significant burden on law enforcement departments and the judicial
system will likely continue to increase. 51 Without the help of
technology to assist in and expedite the warrant application process,
each request for a warrant could further burden both the requesting
law enforcement officer and the reviewing court. If the warrant
procurement process becomes bogged down with more applications,
causing each warrant to take longer to obtain, the exigent
circumstances exception could conceivably be invoked more often
rather than less often. 52 If this occurs, “the exigent circumstances
exception will have eclipsed the warrant requirement itself.” 53
Because of the numerous advantages of implementing
technology in the warrant process and the undesirable consequences
of the day could potentially be difficult, thereby increasing the average time of being able to
obtain a warrant by telephone.
49. See State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 778 (Utah 2007) (“We are confident that,
were law enforcement officials to take advantage of available technology to apply for warrants,
the significance of delay in the exigency analysis would markedly diminish.”).
50. When telephonic search warrants were introduced, courts required more pressing
circumstances to apply the exigent circumstances exception than were required before
telephonic search warrants. See Marek, supra note 31, at 35. If modern technology
continues to develop to the point where it allows for instantaneous procurement of a search
warrant, conceivably the circumstances in which the exigent circumstances exception would
apply would be almost entirely eliminated.
51. Smith, supra note 2, at 1605; see generally RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) (discussing the backlog of cases in the federal system).
52. Smith, supra note 2, at 1605.
53. Id.
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of failing to do so, states that have not updated their criminal
procedure statutes to allow for the utilization of technology in the
warrant application process should do so immediately. However, it is
important to recognize that each state has unique needs, and
therefore each state should implement the program that best
addresses its needs, taking into account its population density, size,
geography, demographics, financial resources, and other important
factors. These unique needs would make it difficult to create a
uniform model code, but state legislators can and should look to
Rule 41(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as a
general guide to update their own criminal codes. 54 For additional
insight, state legislators should also look to similarly situated states
that have already adopted electronic warrant statutes. 55
With the technology available today, courts must no longer
“choose between the warrant requirement, which protects liberty
interests, and warrantless searches, which permit the government to
move swiftly in exigent circumstances.” 56 Modern technology allows
an effective warrant process to be reclaimed and preserved; it
expedites the process by which law enforcement officers may obtain a
warrant to such a degree that circumstances that can truly be
considered exigent are virtually eliminated, thereby “enabl[ing] a
return to a more balanced Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” 57
III. A NEW CONCERN: MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
OATH OR AFFIRMATION CLAUSE
As states implement technology in an effort to restrain the use of
the exigent circumstances exception and reinvigorate the Warrant
Clause, state legislatures must ensure that the methods put in place
comply with the constitutional requirements set forth in the Fourth
Amendment, especially the Oath or Affirmation Clause. The Fourth
Amendment specifically mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but

54. See id., at 1624–25. Rule 41(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
states: “In accordance with Rule 4.1, a magistrate judge may issue a warrant based on
information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means.” FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(d)(3) (emphasis added).
55. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1625. For a list of states that have adopted electronic
signature and warrant statutes, see supra note 40.
56. Beci, supra note 1, at 299.
57. Smith, supra note 2, at 1625.
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upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .” 58
Failure to abide by the oath or affirmation requirement invalidates
any warrant issued and any evidence obtained pursuant to that
warrant. 59 For this reason, it is vital that state legislators fully
understand the standards that must be met to ensure that their
state’s electronic warrant system complies with the Fourth
Amendment’s oath or affirmation requirement.
This section proceeds by first attempting to define what is meant
by an Oath or affirmation. The Supreme Court has never elaborated
on what an Oath means precisely. However, centuries of common
law and commentary reveal the origins of oaths and affirmations, and
understanding these origins sheds light on what the Framers of the
Constitution likely understood oaths and affirmations to entail. This
section will establish that identifying and abiding by the original
understanding of the Framers is the best way to ensure the
constitutionality of modern warrant systems. Lastly, this section
prescribes a series of recommended requirements that state
legislatures can abide by as they frame their respective electronic
warrant systems to ensure that they pass constitutional muster.
A. What Are Oaths and Affirmations?
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an oath as “[a] solemn
declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person
or thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will be bound to a
promise[,]” 60 while an affirmation is defined as “[a] solemn pledge
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
59. See United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
telephonic search warrant was invalid where the oath was not administered by the magistrate
immediately); Levine v. City of Bothell, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(holding a search warrant invalid where police officer’s affidavit in support of the search
warrant was not sworn under oath or signed under penalty of perjury, thereby not satisfying
the Oath or Affirmation Clause). In perhaps its first case interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
the United States Supreme Court invalidated a warrant because it did not contain an oath.
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice John Marshall held that the warrant “was
illegal, for want of stating some good cause certain, supported by oath.” Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 448, 453 (1806) (emphasis in original); see also Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882 (10th
Cir. 1968) (“The constitutional requirement that no search warrants ‘shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation’ is not to be cavalierly brushed aside as an
empty formality. . . . When a magistrate, as in this case, acts as a mere rubber stamp for the
police a basic constitutional protection with roots deep in our national history is reduced to so
many empty words. That cannot be explained away, condoned, excused or tolerated. The
search warrant was clearly and obviously invalid.”).
60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (9th ed. 2009).
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equivalent to an oath but without reference to a supreme being or to
swearing[.]” 61 The legal effect of both an oath and an affirmation is
to subject the person giving testimony to “the penalties for perjury”
if the testimony is false. 62 Today, affirmations are generally regarded
to be equal in weight with oaths. 63
Determining precisely what the Oath or Affirmation Clause
requires is necessary to ensure that electronic warrant systems comply
with the Fourth Amendment. In interpreting the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated that it is
appropriate to determine how the language of the amendment
would be interpreted within its original meaning. 64 The text of the
Fourth Amendment itself does not provide any clues for the content
or form of an oath or affirmation. Therefore, in interpreting what the
requirement entails, it is appropriate to “begin with history,” and, in
particular, “the statutes and common law of the founding era.” 65
1. Oaths as a religious affirmation of truth
The practice of taking oaths is a custom of nearly every culture. 66
For centuries, civilizations have implemented oaths “because we do
not place confidence in the veracity of men in general, when they
profess to speak the truth.” 67 Individuals often lie, particularly when
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Hong Sai Chee v. Long Island R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir.
1964) (“No reason in law exists for differentiation in the quality of truth between an oath and
affirmation. Plaintiff’s capacity to tell the truth and the truthfulness of his testimony [after
affirming] were not diminished in any way by his failure to take an oath and no statement that
they might have been should have been made.”).
64. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012) (“[O]ur task, at a
minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted a ‘search’ within
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
65. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008).
66. See Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of
Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in
America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (2009). In ancient societies, individuals would make an oath
by calling upon a beast or a thing of nature to witness the truth of what the oath-taker was
attesting to and to harm the oath-taker if what he was saying was false. Thomas Raeburn
White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect Upon the Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM.
L. REG. 373, 374 (1903). What is likely the oldest recorded example of an oath can be found
in the Old Testament’s account of a conversation between Abraham and the King of Sodom
found in Genesis 14:22–23. JAMES ENDELL TYLER, OATHS: THEIR ORIGIN, NATURE, AND
HISTORY 96–97 (1834).
67. TYLER, supra note 66, at 6.
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it is in their best interest and the situation involves high-stakes
matters. 68 Because of this, procedures that promote truth, such as
oaths, are used to combat the “internal and natural inclinations” to
act in line with “egoistic self-interest.” 69 Oftentimes, oaths expressly
invoke divine or supernatural punishment to the oath-taker if he or
she should swear falsely. 70
Under early English common law, only Christians could be
sworn under oath as witnesses. 71 Sir Edward Coke, 72 a prominent
early–seventeenth-century English jurist, endorsed the idea that only
Christians could be sworn under oath, explaining that under English
common law, an oath was “an affirmation or denial by any Christian
of anything lawful and honest, before one or more, that have
authority to give the same for advancement of truth and right,
calling Almighty God to witness, that his testimony is true.” 73 It was
not until the mid–eighteenth-century seminal case Omychund v.
Barker that the English common law’s restriction against nonChristians taking oaths as witnesses was lifted. 74 Omychund marked a
major change in the common law and presaged modern Western
oath practices. In a concurring opinion, the Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke explained that “the obligation of an oath . . . depends
wholly upon the sense and ‘belief of a Deity,’” not necessarily a
belief in the Christian God. 75 The Lord Chief Justice Lee observed
that so long as “the witness is of a religion, it is sufficient; for the
foundation of all religion is the belief of a God.” 76

68. Milhizer, supra note 66, at 5; see also White, supra note 66, at 373 (“Every man
naturally seeks to promote the welfare of himself and his family before that of his neighbor.
Unless he be largely influenced by considerations of morality or religion, he will, if necessary,
tell a lie for that purpose.”).
69. Milhizer, supra note 66, at 5–6.
70. See TYLER, supra note 66, at 13–14.
71. See White, supra note 66, at 386–87. By the early eighteenth century, the common
law generally permitted Jews to also be sworn under oath as witnesses. See 2 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (3d ed. 1739).
72. Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634) was an English barrister and judge who is widely
regarded to be the greatest jurist of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras. J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 167 (4th ed. 2002).
73. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 165 (1797) (emphasis
added) (spelling modernized).
74. Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B.); 1 Atk. 22.
75. Id. at 32–33.
76. Id. at 31.
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This English common law understanding of oaths was the basis
for the lawmakers’ understanding of oaths on the American
continent. 77 As early American lawmakers established the first laws
and legal procedures governing oaths, they continued to extensively
borrow from their English forebearers. The United States
Constitution mandates that oaths must be used to inaugurate some
of the most significant government officials. 78 By the beginning of
the twentieth century, nearly every state had adopted some
legislation that incorporated the oath requirement. 79
2. Affirmations as an alternative to oaths
Just like an oath, an affirmation serves to promote truth;
however, unlike an oath, affirmations do not invoke divine
authority. 80 An affirmation “does retain all of the other key elements
that provide significance to an oath: a public proclamation that is
formally made in a way designed to awaken the conscience of the
person affirming, under the penalty of perjury.” 81
The original purpose of allowing the use of affirmations in lieu of
oaths was to accommodate particular Christian sects, most notably the
Quakers, whose religious beliefs prohibited the swearing of oaths. 82

77. Milhizer, supra note 66, at 27–28.
78. The United States Constitution incorporates the oath requirements in four places:
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 (Senators “shall be on Oath or Affirmation” when sitting for the
purpose of impeachment); Article II, Section 1, Clause 8 (the President shall take the
enumerated oath or affirmation before entering office); Article VI, Clause 3 (Senators,
Representatives, members of State Legislatures, and all federal and state executive and judicial
officers “shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”); and
Amendment IV (requiring an “Oath or affirmation” to obtain a warrant).
79. See 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1828, at 2364 (1904).
80. Milhizer, supra note 66, at 37.
81. Id.
82. Some religious sects, such as the Quakers, objected to taking oaths based on the
admonition of Jesus Christ in Matthew 5:33–37:
Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not
forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths:
But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God’s throne:
Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great
King.
Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or
black.
But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than
these cometh of evil.

941

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 4:13 PM

2014

Because the common law required witnesses to be put under oath,
religious objections by Quakers and other minority Christian sects
resulted in their exclusion as witnesses. This “effectively precluded
these groups from using the court system to protect themselves and
left them vulnerable to their adversaries, ‘who could sue them for
property and never doubt the result.’” 83 Quakers and other Protestant
dissenters remained legally disadvantaged until near the end of the
seventeenth century, when the English Parliament began to provide
relief from many of the laws that were oppressive to them. 84 Beginning
in 1696, Quakers were “permitted in judicial proceedings to make a
solemn affirmation” in lieu of an oath, thus allowing them to provide
evidence in judicial proceedings.85
Similar to how the English common law understanding of oaths
was the basis for early American lawmakers’ understanding of oaths,
so too was the understanding of American lawmakers regarding the
use of affirmations heavily influenced by English common law. 86 By
the time the United States Constitution was ratified, affirmations had
become so generally accepted that they were expressly incorporated
in each instance where an oath was required. 87 Where an oath was
constitutionally required, an affirmation was constitutionally
permitted. Also, similar to oaths, by the turn of the twentieth
century, almost every state permitted affirmations in lieu of oaths for
“either persons who were forbidden by ‘conscientious scruples’ or
anyone who may have such a preference.” 88
B. Ensuring That Electronic Warrant Systems Satisfy the Requirements
of the Oath or Affirmation Clause
When the Framers of the Fourth Amendment drafted the Oath
or Affirmation Clause, they likely envisioned law enforcement
83. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467 (1990) (quoting ROBERT J BRUGGER, MARYLAND:
A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 30 (1988)).
84. See White, supra note 66, at 420.
85. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 369 n.22
(Barron Fields Analysis, 1860). This accommodation applied only in civil cases, not in criminal
cases. Id.
86. See Milhizer, supra note 66, at 38.
87. See supra note 78 (discussing the place of oaths in the Constitution).
88. Milhizer, supra note 66, at 39 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 79, § 1828, at 2371)
(noting that every state except for Oklahoma that had passed a statute on the matter permitted
the use of affirmations in lieu of oaths).
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officers appearing in person before magistrates when applying for a
search warrant. The thought of satisfying the oath or affirmation
requirement by testifying over a telephone, facsimile, email, laptop
computer, tablet, or through other modern electronic means would
never have crossed any of the Framers’ minds. But with the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause being slowly eroded through the
broad application of the exigent circumstances exception,
implementing new technology is a valuable resource to help the
Warrant Clause reclaim its place in protecting individuals’ liberty
interests in situations in which the exigent circumstances exception
would otherwise apply. 89 However, state legislatures must ensure
that the systems they design and implement are consistent with both
the original purpose of oaths and affirmations and courts’ modern
application of Fourth Amendment principles.
1. The “true test” for satisfying the oath or affirmation requirement
In designing an electronic warrant system, states have a great
deal of flexibility in the manner in which they wish to satisfy the oath
or affirmation requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The oath or
affirmation requirement “is a matter of substance, not form.” 90
Neither the United States Constitution nor federal statutes mandate
that oaths take any particular form, 91 and state laws typically give
considerable leeway concerning an adequate form for oaths and
affirmations. 92 Therefore, contrary to popular belief, there is no
particular ceremony that is necessary to constitute the act of taking
an oath or affirmation. 93 The only requirement is that both the
89. See supra Part II.
90. 2 WYANE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.3(e), at 660 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 478
(Wis. 2001)).
91. Milhizer, supra note 66, at 35.
92. See, e.g., H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 262
(Alaska 1977), order supplemented, 566 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1977) (holding that substantial
compliance on the part of affiants with the elements necessary to form a legal document is
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of an oath or affirmation).
93. See United States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[A] person
may be under oath even though that person has not formally taken an oath by raising a hand
and reciting formulaic words.”); People v. Sullivan, 437 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (N.Y. 1982)
(“There is no constitutional prescription as to the particular form of the ‘oath or affirmation’
or the exact manner in which it is to be administered. In the usual case, there will be a formal
swearing before a notary to the truth of the information provided, and any written statements
submitted in support of the warrant application generally will contain the traditional jurat. This

943

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 4:13 PM

2014

magistrate issuing the warrant and the law enforcement officer
applying for the warrant must understand that the warrant applicant
is taking an oath or affirmation. 94
Even though it is not necessary that electronic warrant
applications contain any specific wording to constitute an oath or
affirmation, 95 it is critical that the wording used in electronic warrant
applications impress upon the warrant applicant “an appropriate
sense of obligation to tell the truth.” 96 As Fourth Amendment
scholar Wayne R. LaFave notes, the “true test” for satisfying the
oath or affirmation requirement is whether the affiant could be
charged with perjury if a material allegation in the affidavit were
false. 97 Although no precise wording is necessary to constitute an
oath or affirmation, states could ensure that their electronic warrant
application affidavits satisfy the oath or affirmation requirement by
including a statement which plainly alerts the affiant to the fact that
he or she could be charged with perjury if his or her statement is
false. 98 Such a statement could be as simple as, “False statements
made herein are punishable as a Class A Misdemeanor pursuant to
section 210.45 of the Penal Law,” 99 and should explicitly state that
the affiant’s false statement is punishable as a crime. At least one
court has held that including such a formal notice in writing “may

does not mean, however, that such procedural formality is the sine qua non of the ‘oath or
affirmation’ requirement.”).
94. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 90, at 658–59.
95. Indeed, the Framers did not understand an oath or affirmation as requiring
particular wording. Different language used by different state constitutions illustrate that there
was not a consensus among the states as to a particular language that constituted an oath or
affirmation. Compare DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22 (providing that incoming office holders
take an “oath, or affirmation,” which includes stating that they “will bear true allegiance”),
with N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII (requiring incoming legislators to “take the following
oath or affirmation, viz: ‘I, A.B., do solemnly declare’”), and PENN. CONST. of 1776, art. II, §
10 (requiring incoming legislators to take the “oath or affirmation of fidelity and allegiance . . .
viz: I—do swear (or affirm)”).
96. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 90 (quoting State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Wis.
2001)).
97. Id. at 659.
98. See Sullivan, 437 N.E.2d at 1133 (“[A] method of verification by which the maker
of the statement is first alerted to the criminal consequences of knowingly providing false
information in connection with a warrant application and then voluntarily acknowledges his
acceptance of those consequences should suffice for purposes of the constitutional mandate
that a warrant be issued upon proof ‘supported by oath or affirmation.’”).
99. This is the wording that was used in the affidavit involved in Sullivan, 437 N.E.2d
at 1132.
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provide a greater practical assurance against intentional
misstatements of fact than the more mechanical and ofttimes routine
procedure of swearing before a notary” or judge. 100 The wording
need not invoke God or a supreme being because, as noted above,
affirmations carry sufficient legal weight. What is vital to satisfying
the constitutional requirement is to include language that threatens
perjury, which has been proven to be an effective tool to impress
upon a person the importance of telling the truth by emphasizing
the legal consequences of making a false statement when providing
the probable cause for the search. 101
2. Satisfying the signature requirement
After satisfying this “true test” of including a statement that
unequivocally subjects the affiant to perjury if a material allegation in
the affidavit is false, state legislators must also ensure that the
affiant’s signature is attached to their statement in a legally binding
way. Without a legally binding signature, the oath or affirmation
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not satisfied, regardless of
the particularized wording of the statement invoking the penalty of
perjury for false testimony. 102 There are various ways to satisfy the
signature requirement, and different local jurisdictions should
implement the method that local lawmakers feel best balances the
necessity of making the process as quick as possible to eliminate the
exigent circumstances exception while still impressing the
importance of the matter onto the affiant to satisfy the oath or
affirmation requirement while working within their specific
budgetary constraints. The following is a non-exhaustive list of three
different ways to satisfy the requirement, as well as the benefits and
drawbacks of each method.
One method in implementing modern technology is for the
affiant to email the affidavit to the reviewing magistrate and swear
her affirmation over a face-to-face remote video conversation, such as
Skype. 103 This method may be appropriate in jurisdictions that want
to maintain closer contact between the officer applying for the

100. Sullivan, 437 N.E.2d at 1134.
101. See Swingle & Thomasson, supra note 16, at 17.
102. See Beci, supra note 1, at 298.
103. See Swingle & Thomasson, supra note 16, at 20 (noting that a county in Missouri
has plans in place to implement Skype in its electronic search warrant process).

945

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 4:13 PM

2014

warrant and the magistrate that reviews the warrant, more closely
resembling the traditional method of obtaining a warrant by
appearing in person before a magistrate. This method shares some of
the benefits of telephonic search warrant applications, including
providing the magistrate with the “opportunity to examine the
affiant should any questions arise in his mind concerning any of the
allegations in the affidavit or of the sufficiency of the affidavit as a
whole.” 104 Importantly, using face-to-face video technology also
allows the magistrate to make observations and credibility judgments
about the demeanor of the affiant, 105 although how much judges rely
on such evidence in issuing a warrant is not entirely clear. 106 This
method might be more redundant and time consuming than
necessary, since the applying officer must also email his or her
affidavit (that already contains the necessary information to receive a
warrant) to the judge. The more time-consuming the process, the
more likely that the exigent circumstances exception may be
employed. However, the combination of an email and
videoconference is preferred over only having a videoconference
because the email creates a paper trail that only holding a
videoconference would not. 107 A disadvantage of this method is that
law enforcement agencies would need to make face-to-face video
technology readily available to both police officers in the field and
judges, which could prove to be cost prohibitive depending on the
resources available to local law enforcement agencies.
Another method of implementing modern technology in the
warrant procurement process is for the officer or judge to place their
electronic signatures on electronically submitted documents using the
format: /s/ John or Jane Person. 108 Earlier this year, the Indiana
legislature approved the use of electronic signatures on an affidavit and

104. Smith, supra note 2, at 1615 (quoting People v. Chavez, 27 Cal. App. 3d 883, 886
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
105. See E. John Wherry, Jr., Vampire or Dinosaur: A Time to Revisit Schmerber v.
California?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 503, 528–29 (1996) (stating that the demeanor or
credibility evidence is important to the judicial function in issuing warrants).
106. Smith, supra note 2, at 1614–15 (“While those unfamiliar with the criminal justice
system may believe that magistrates scrupulously review evidence and meticulously question
affiants, in reality, warrant applications are often approved after only minimal inspection.”).
107. See Paul D. Beechen, Oral Search Warrants: A New Standard of Warrant
Availability, 21 UCLA L. REV. 691, 701 (1973) (noting that telephonic search warrants lack a
written record between the magistrate and the affiant for later courts to review).
108. See Swingle & Thomasson, supra note 16, at 19.
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warrant, noting that “[a]n electronic signature may be indicated by
‘s/Affiant’s Name’ or ‘s/Judge’s Name’ or by any other electronic
means that identifies the affiant or judge and indicates that the affiant
or judge adopts the contents of the document to which the electronic
signature is attached.” 109 This method is preferable over simply
checking a box on a web application form screen 110 and implements
laptop computer technology that is already widely available in police
vehicles and judges’ chambers, so purchasing expensive new
equipment would be unnecessary.
The final potential method is for the affiant or judge to use an
electronic written signature. 111 There is currently a variety of
computer programs, applications, and hardware that make it possible
to include a person’s actual signature within the body of an email or
other document. For example, the officer could use an iPad to sign
his or her signature, and then use an iPad application to securely
attach that signature to his or her electronically composed affidavit
before sending it to the judge for review. The greatest benefit of this
method is that the act of actually signing one’s name and attaching
the signature to a document impresses the importance of the matter
onto the affiant, thereby satisfying a key component of the oath or
affirmation requirement. Signing a signature by hand is more likely
to help the affiant realize the importance of his or her actions than
simply typing characters on a keyboard, as would be the case in the
previous two methods. However, similar to the drawbacks of the
face-to-face videoconference method described previously, this
method would require law enforcement agencies to purchase and

109. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-8(h) (West 2014); see also MO. SUP. CT. R. 103.04(d)
(approving a similar method in contexts other than warrant applications, stating that “[a]n
electronic document requiring a signature shall be signed by an original signature, stamped
signature or an electronic graphic representation of a signature, or in the following manner:
/s/ John or Jane Person”).
110. Courts have held that simply checking a box on a computer screen is legally binding
in at least one other context. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a purchaser of computer software accepted the offer and terms contained
within a computer program license by clicking through a dialog box). However, as noted in
Part III.B.1, the most important requirement is to impress upon the person making the
statement the importance of telling the truth by emphasizing the legal consequences of making
a false statement. Requiring the persons testifying to take the extra step to sign their name
rather than simply checking a box would more clearly impress upon them the significance of
their testimony.
111. Swingle & Thomasson, supra note 16, at 19.
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maintain new touchscreen devices, which might prove costprohibitive to some agencies.
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In summary, understanding the original meaning of the Oath or
Affirmation Clause is necessary to ensure that state-implemented
electronic warrant systems comply with the Fourth Amendment. In
implementing new technologies, state legislatures must ensure that
the systems they design are consistent with both the original purpose
of oaths and affirmations and courts’ modern application of Fourth
Amendment principles. Based on the original purpose of oaths and
affirmations, the true test for satisfying the oath or affirmation
requirement is to impress upon the affiant that he or she could be
charged with perjury if a material allegation in the affidavit used to
procure a warrant were false. States could best ensure that their
electronic warrant application system satisfies this requirement by
including a statement that plainly alerts the affiant to the fact that he
or she could be charged with perjury if his or her statement is false.
State legislatures must also ensure that the affiant’s signature is
attached to his or her statement in a way that carries legal weight. As
lawmakers implement the form of technology that best fits their
jurisdiction’s needs, they will more readily be able to ensure that the
Oath or Affirmation Clause of the Fourth Amendment is satisfied,
despite officers’ lack of appearing in person before a judge to obtain
a warrant.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to better protect the privacy and liberty interests of
American citizens, state legislatures should update their state’s
criminal code to allow law enforcement officers and reviewing courts
to utilize the most modern technology in an effort to narrow the
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Clause. The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Oath or
Affirmation Clauses were intended by the Framers to serve as a check
on government power designed to protect and preserve Americans’
liberty and privacy interest. The exigent circumstances exception has
been one of the means most often used by law enforcement officials
to circumvent the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Although the exigent circumstances exception was once necessary to
secure time-sensitive evidence due to the often long amounts of time
it took to procure a warrant, the time has come when modern
technology can and should be utilized to foster a seamless
connection between law enforcement personnel and judges.
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This new technology, including laptops and tablets with cellular
capabilities, enables a law enforcement officer to remotely apply for
and obtain a warrant in a matter of minutes, a significant decrease in
time from previous warrant application methods. Because advanced
communications technology dramatically decreases the amount of
time necessary to obtain a warrant, the circumstances that are
considered exigent and an exception to the warrant requirement
should also decrease. State legislatures should implement such
technologies in their state’s warrant application systems and reinforce
the vital protections that warrants provide to American society.
However, as state legislatures work to utilize new technology,
they must be mindful of the requirements set forth in the Fourth
Amendment’s Oath or Affirmation Clause. A careful analysis of the
history of oaths and affirmations, and the Framers’ likely
understanding of oaths and affirmations at the time of the drafting of
the Fourth Amendment, reveals that the oath or affirmation
requirement is satisfied when the person providing testimony is
impressed with the seriousness of his or her statement and
understands that she could be charged with perjury if his or her
statement is false. In designing states’ electronic warrant systems,
states should use language in the warrant application process that
plainly alerts the affiant submitting the application of this reality.
Also, in order to satisfy the oath or affirmation requirement, state
legislatures should ensure that the affiant’s signature is attached in a
form that is legally binding upon the affiant.
In sum, as state legislatures strive to update their criminal codes to
utilize the most modern technology, the liberty interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause will be reinforced because
situations in which the exigent circumstances exception applies will
likely decrease. In utilizing this new technology, state legislatures
should protect their warrant application systems from constitutional
challenges by implementing systems that (1) impress upon the affiant
the legal significance of her statement, and (2) require a signature
electronically attached to the document, thereby satisfying the oath or
affirmation requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Andrew H. Bean*
* J.D. Candidate 2015, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I
would like to thank Professor Eric Talbot Jensen for helping me develop this topic and for his
helpful suggestions. Thanks also to the editors of the BYU Law Review.

950

